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DECLARES THE SEC’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGES UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN BANDIMERE V.
SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Casey M. Olesen*
ABSTRACT
Since the passage of the APA, administrative agencies’ use of Administrative
Law Judges (ALJs) to preside over hearings has exploded, and now far outpaces the
number trials conducted before federal judges. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) is one such agency that heavily utilizes ALJs to conduct their
hearings. Recently, following an apparent higher percentage of SEC wins before
their own ALJs as compared to before federal judges, a new constitutional challenge
on the basis of the Appointments Clause has been brought before several circuits;
that the SEC’s ALJs are inferior officers of the SEC, not employees, and therefore
are required to be appointed pursuant to the requirements of the Appointments
Clause. The support for this challenge comes from the Supreme Court’s decision in
Freytag v. Commissioner, which laid out three indicia of inferior officer status. In
2016, both the D.C. Circuit and the Tenth Circuit had occasion to decide this issue,
with the former ruling in favor of the SEC’s ALJs, and the latter against. The circuit
split has left the status of the SEC’s ALJs in a state of flux, with more challenges
certain to come, including challenges to other agencies’ ALJs. This Note argues that
the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Bandimere v. SEC more faithfully applied the
Supreme Court’s indicia of officer status, and properly declared the SEC’s ALJs
inferior officers.
I. INTRODUCTION
“Today the Federal Government has a corps of administrative law judges numbering
more than 1,000 whose principle statutory function is the conduct of adjudication
under the Administrative Procedures Act. They are all executive officers.”1
The modern Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) position was created by
Congress in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (“APA”), replacing the
position previously known as “hearing examiners.”2 Prior to the APA, concerns
often arose that hearing examiners could not truly exercise independent judgment
*

J.D. Candidate, University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2018. The Author would like to thank
Professor Jeff Thaler for his many edits and comments over multiple drafts and for providing guidance in
the writing of this Note. The Author is also grateful to his editor, Ashley Perry, as well as his family for
their continued support.
1
Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 910 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
2
Classification & Qualifications, OFFICE PERS. MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/policy-dataoversight/classification-qualifications/general-schedule-qualification-standards/specialtyareas/administrative-law-judge-positions/ [https://perma.cc/B32Y-C5RX]; see also Ramspeck v. Fed.
Trial Exam'rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 130 (1953).
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because they were subordinate to executive officers within the agency they served,
and performed both prosecutorial and investigative work in addition to their judicial
role.3 The APA attempted to remedy these concerns by adding protections
guaranteeing the independence of ALJs.4
Since the passage of the APA, the use of ALJs and administrative hearings has
exploded and now far outpaces the number of traditional trials within the United
States.5 In fact, federal judges will decide roughly 95,000 adjudicatory proceedings
in a year, including trials. 6 But that number pales in comparison to the more than
939,000 adjudicatory proceedings that are completed by federal administrative
agencies in that same period.7 Under this system, the modern ALJ has powers that
the Supreme Court has described as “functionally comparable” to those of an Article
III judge.8 Commensurate with this power, ALJs have been granted immunity for
actions taken in their judicial roles.9
As of 2016, the Federal Government employs over 1,770 ALJs. 10 A sampling
of agencies employing ALJs include the National Labor Relations Board (thirty-four
ALJs), the United States Postal Service (one ALJ), the Department of Labor (fortyone ALJs), and the Department of Health and Human Service’s Office of Medicare
Hearings and Appeals (eighty ALJs).11 But of all agencies, the Social Security
Administration employs by far the most at over 1,500.12 At interest here, however,
are the ALJs utilized by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which presently
employs five ALJs.13
In 2010, the authority granted to the SEC’s ALJs was expanded by the DoddFrank Act, expanding the civil penalties available to ALJs, and extending their
jurisdiction.14 Since the expansion, there has been a jump in the SEC’s use of
administrative hearings rather than federal trials to adjudicate enforcement actions. 15
3

Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513-14 (1978).
Id. at 514.
5
Jonathon Turley, The Rise of the Fourth Branch of Government, THE WASH. POST (May
24,
2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-rise-of-the-fourth-branch-ofgovernment/2013/05/24/c7faaad0-c2ed-11e2-9fe2-6ee52d0eb7c1_story.html
[https://perma.cc/TDE9-7GW7]; see also W. Michael Gillette, Administrative Law Judges,
Judicial Independence, and Judicial Review: Qui Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?, 20 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 95, 100 (2000) (noting that the Social Security Administration’s
ALJs decided more cases in one year than all traditional court systems in the United States
combined).
6
Turley, supra note 5.
7
Id.
8
Butz, 438 U.S. at 513.
9
Id. at 514.
10
Office of Personnel Management, Administrative Law Judges, https://www.opm.gov/services-foragencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency [https://perma.cc/DQ5M-RJVV] (number of
ALJs current as of December 2016).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1, 78u-2(a), 80a-9(d)(1), 80b-3(i)(1) (2012) (penalties available); 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78o, 78o-4, 78q-1, 78u-3, 80b-3 (2012) (jurisdiction).
15
Breon Peace et al., The Future of SEC Administrative Proceedings, LAW360 (Jan. 4, 2017, 11:20
AM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/876875/the-future-of-sec-administrative-proceedings
[https://perma.cc/3F2P-4JTA].
4
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Exemplifying this jump, the SEC brought only thirty-five percent of its enforcement
actions as administrative hearings between 2010 and 2013, but in 2015 brought
seventy-six percent.16 This is less surprising when noting that the SEC prevailed in
sixty-one percent of cases brought in federal court, but one hundred percent of inhouse administrative hearings before its ALJs in 2014. 17 Even further, it has been
suggested by commentators that administrative proceeding procedural rules
disadvantage those against whom enforcement actions are brought. 18
This variation in outcome between the two forums has been brought to the
public’s eye by large media outlets, compounding the view that administrative
proceedings are inherently unfair to defendants. 19 But it is important to note that
critics have found at least one such study to be empirically unfounded. 20 In a recent
review, a commentator noted that “there is no robust correlation between the selected
forum and case outcome.”21 However, this conclusion was caged by a statement that
the “finding does not imply that the type of forum in which the SEC litigates does
not matter. Rather, there are significant empirical obstacles to finding any useful
results by comparing case outcomes.” 22
The apparent disparity, whether empirically founded or not, between the SEC’s
win rates in federal trials versus in-house administrative proceedings lends itself to
challenge in court.23 While many of these challenges focus on due process, equal
protection, or the right to a trial,24 a new constitutional challenge has begun to
emerge–that the SEC’s ALJs hold their positions in contravention to the
Constitution.25 That challenge is based on the Appointments Clause, which requires
that officers of the United States be appointed in a specific manner. 26 The Seventh
Circuit was the first federal appellate court to have this issue before it, but dismissed
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.27 However, in 2016, two separate
Circuit Courts reached the merits of the Appointments Clause challenge to SEC

16

Id.
Carmen Germaine, Circuits Split Widely On SEC Judges’ Constitutionality, LAW360 (Jan. 3, 2017,
10:31
PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/876758/circuits-split-widely-on-sec-judgesconstitutionality [https://perma.cc/YMD2-2MKD].
18
See William McLucas & Matthew Martens, How to Rein in the SEC, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-rein-in-the-sec-1433285747 [https://perma.cc/X2RZ-FCPX].
19
See e.g., Jean Eaglesham, SEC is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21,
2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-is-steering-more-trials-to-judges-it-appoints-1413849590
[https://perma.cc/F9U9-XYZY]; Gretchen Morgenson, At the SEC, a Question of Home-Court Edge, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/at-the-sec-a-question-of-homecourt-edge.html [https://perma.cc/L8EK-QLF3].
20
See, e.g., Urska Velikonja, Are the SEC’s Administrative Law Judges Biased? An Empirical
Investigation, 92 WASH. L. REV. 315, 315 (2017) (asserting that “the evidence offered by the Wall Street
Journal is deficient and its conclusions unfounded”).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
See David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L.R. 1155, 1157-59, 1158 n.10
(2016) (citing cases where the constitutionality of SEC administrative proceedings has been challenged).
24
Id.
25
See, e.g., Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 281 (2d Cir. 2016); Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 768 (7th
Cir. 2015).
26
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
27
Bebo, 799 F.3d at 768.
17
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ALJs, with a third dismissing the claim on jurisdictional grounds. 28 In the circuits
that reached the merits, the losing parties filed for rehearing en banc—both were
denied.29
This Note considers the question of whether or not SEC ALJs are inferior
officers subject to the Appointments Clause, arguing for an affirmative answer to
that question through an interpretation of the most applicable Supreme Court
precedent, Freytag v. Commissioner. This question is presented through the lens of
the Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Bandimere v. SEC, where a divided panel
decided that the SEC’s ALJs were inferior officers requiring constitutional
appointment.30 An opposing view is offered in Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, where
the D.C. Circuit held to the contrary.31
First, a brief overview of the factual and procedural background of Bandimere
is presented. Next, the applicable legal framework is provided, including a general
overview of the ALJ position, the Appointments Clause, and the Supreme Court’s
precedent in Freytag. The opposing views of the D.C. Circuit and the Tenth Circuit
are then presented, followed by an analysis of why the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation
of Freytag properly applies the Supreme Court’s precedent on the Appointments
Clause, and better balances other considerations relevant to the discussion of the role
of ALJs.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 6, 2012, the SEC issued an Order Instituting Administrative
Proceedings against David F. Bandimere, alleging multiple violations of various
antifraud and registration provisions established by multiple securities statutes and
SEC rules.32 The allegations included operating as an unregistered broker and selling
unregistered investments in Ponzi schemes, misleading investors by solely providing
positive outlooks on investments, and failing to disclose any red flags or potentially
negative facts about investments.33 Bandimere admitted that the companies were
Ponzi schemes, but denied any further allegations, claiming that he was also a victim
of the Ponzi schemes with an investment of $1.2 million dollars of his own money
into the same companies.34
An administrative hearing was held from April 22 to April 26, 2013, and on May
2, 2013.35 The hearing was presided over by one of the SEC’s ALJs. 36 On October
28

See Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding SEC ALJs to be
employees), petition for cert. filed, No. 17-130 (U.S. July 26, 2017); Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168,
1181 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding SEC ALJs to be inferior officers requiring appointment), petition for cert.
filed, No. 17-475 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2017); Tilton, 824 F.3d at 281 (dismissing for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction).
29
Bandimere v. SEC, 855 F.3d 1128, 1128 (10th Cir. 2017) (denying rehearing en banc); Raymond
J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2017 WL 2727019, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017) (per curiam)
(denying rehearing en banc).
30
844 F.3d at 1181.
31
832 F.3d at 289.
32
David F. Bandimere, SEC Release No. 507, 2013 WL 5553898, *1 (Oct. 8, 2013).
33
Id.
34
Id. at *2.
35
Id. at *1.
36
Id.
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8, 2013, the ALJ issued an initial decision, concluding that Bandimere committed
the myriad of violations alleged against him.37 The ALJ imposed civil penalties of
$390,000, ordered disgorgement of $638,056.33 plus prejudgment interest, and
barred Bandimere from the securities industry. 38
Bandimere appealed this decision, seeking review of the ALJ’s decision by the
Commission.39 Bandimere advanced multiple arguments to the Commission,
including an arbitrary and capricious denial of an evidence production request
against the SEC, an Equal Protection Clause claim, and most importantly, an
Appointments Clause claim.40 The SEC upheld the ALJ's denial of Bandimere’s
request for evidence production and rejected his Equal Protection claim. 41 These
issues were not reached upon appeal.42 As for the Appointment’s Clause challenge,
the SEC Commission conceded that the ALJ had not been properly appointed, but
ultimately rejected the challenge.43 The SEC defended this result by viewing its
ALJs not as officers requiring appointment, but as mere employees. 44
The SEC Commission ultimately found Bandimere liable, issuing a separate
final opinion instituting the same penalties imposed by the ALJ. 45 Following the
SEC Commission’s final order, Bandimere appealed to the Tenth Circuit, once again
raising an Appointments Clause challenge.46
III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
The administrative law judge position “is not a creature of administrative law;
rather it is a direct creation of Congress . . . .”47 The position’s duties and functions
are set forth within the APA, which allows for ALJs to preside over the taking of
evidence at an administrative hearing. 48 An administrative agency may “appoint as
many administrative law judges as are necessary for proceedings” conducted
pursuant to the APA.49
All ALJs are hired through a merit-selection process administered by the Office
of Personnel Management (“OPM”).50 Aspiring ALJs must be licensed, active status
attorneys or have judicial status, and are ranked according to an exam administered
by the OPM.51 The SEC then hires from the top three ranked candidates.52 Once
hired, an ALJ holds their position for the entirety of their career, and can only be
fired by the United States Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”) for good
37

Id.
Id. at *85-86.
39
David F. Bandimere, SEC Release No. 9972, 2015 WL 6575665, *1 (Oct. 29, 2015).
40
Id. at *17-23.
41
Id. at *17, *22-23.
42
See Bandimere v. SEC., 844 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2016).
43
David F. Bandimere, SEC Release No. 9972, 2015 WL 6575665, *19-21 (Oct. 29, 2015).
44
Id.
45
Id. at *32.
46
Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1171.
47
Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 540 n.5 (6th Cir. 1986).
48
5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2012).
49
Id. § 3105.
50
Id. § 1302; 5 C.F.R. § 930.201 (2007).
51
5 C.F.R. §§ 930.204, 337.101.
52
Bandimere v. SEC., 844 F.3d 1168, 1176-77 (10th Cir. 2016).
38
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cause.53
Agencies are able to delegate certain authority to its ALJs. For the SEC,
statutory authority provides that “any of its functions” may be delegated to its ALJs
with the exception of rulemaking.54 Utilizing that authority, the SEC has delegated
the ability to “conduct hearings” and the “responsib[ility] for the fair and orderly
conduct of the proceedings” to its ALJs, including the “authority to do all things
necessary and appropriate to discharge [their] duties.”55 This includes the
administration of oaths and affirmations; the determination of “scope and form of
evidence”; the entering of default judgment; examination of witnesses; issuance of
protective orders; issuance, modification, and revocation of subpoenas; ruling on all
motions; ruling on evidentiary issues; and the preparation of initial factual findings,
legal conclusions, and appropriate order.56
IV. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
The Appointments Clause has been described by the Supreme Court as having
been drafted with more than “etiquette or protocol [] describing ‘Officers of the
United States,’” and the appointment process in mind. 57 Instead, it “is among the
significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme.”58 It its entirety, the
Appointments Clause states:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and consuls, Judges of
the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments
are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.59

This clause encompasses both structural and political principles. First, it serves as a
safeguard “against one branch’s aggrandizing its power at the expense of another
branch,”60 while “preventing the diffusion of the appointment power.” 61 Such
protections “embod[y] both separation of powers and checks and balances.” 62
Second, the Appointments Clause is “designed to ensure public accountability for
both the making of a bad appointment and the rejection of a good one.”63 Thus, those
53
5 U.S.C. § 7521(a), (b) (setting forth actions the MSPB can take against ALJS); 5 C.F.R. § 930.204
(“An administrative law judge receives a career appointment . . . .”). The Merit Systems Protection Board
consists of three members appointed by the President, and removable only for good cause. 5 C.F.R. §
1200.2 (1991).
54
15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a) (2012).
55
17 C.F.R. §§ 200.14, 201.111 (2017).
56
Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1178 (listing duties and corresponding statutes and regulations).
57
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam).
58
Edmond v. United States., 520 U.S. 651, 660 (1997).
59
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
60
Freytag v. Comm’r., 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991).
61
Id.
62
Bandimere v. SEC., 844 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2016).
63
Edmond, 520 U.S. at 660 (quoting Hamilton as observing that “[t]he blame of a bad nomination
would fall upon the president singly and absolutely,” while “[t]he censure of a good [nomination] would
lie entirely at the door of the senate . . . .”).
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wielding constitutional appointment power are “accountable to political force and
the will of the people.”64
Beyond those lofty principles, the Appointments Clause does, in fact, also
describe the procedures required to be used in appointing two classes of officers,
principal officers (“officers”) and inferior officers. To satisfy the Appointments
Clause, an officer of the United States must be nominated by the President, and
confirmed by the Senate.65 This method of appointment is also considered the
“default manner of appointment for inferior officers.” 66 However, the Appointments
Clause has an “Excepting Clause” allowing for Congress to confer the ability to
appoint inferior officers to “the President alone, the Courts of Law, or the Heads of
Departments.”67 This “very clearly divides . . . officers into two classes.” 68
This distinction between classes of officers arose due to the foresight of the
Framers, who realized that “when offices become numerous, and sudden removals
necessary,” requiring the action of both the President and the Senate “might be
inconvenient.”69 Therefore, the Constitution provides for Congress to delegate its
constitutionally vested appointments power to the President, a court of law, or the
head of a department.70
An officer of the United States has been simply described as “any appointee
exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States,” or “all
persons who can be said to hold an office under the government . . . .” 71 Inferior
officers also exercise such authority, but are distinct from an officer in that "the term
‘inferior officer’ connotes a relationship with some higher ranking officer or officers
below the President . . . .”72 The Supreme Court has then helpfully stated that a
determination of whether an officer is “inferior” rests on “whether he has a
superior.”73
Beyond that extremely circular definition, the Supreme Court has described
inferior officers in various other ways, including: those being charged with “the
administration and enforcement of the public law,” 74 persons being granted
“significant authority,”75 those holding the “responsibility for conducting civil
litigation in the courts of the United States,”76 and those that hold an office created
by regulations or statutes.77
Over a span of more than 150 years, the Court has declined to state a specific

64

Freytag, 501 U.S. at 884.
See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659-60; United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1878).
66
Id. at 660.
67
Id.; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
68
Germaine, 99 U.S. at 510.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam); Germaine, 99 U.S. at 510.
72
Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662.
73
Id.
74
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 139.
75
Id. at 126.
76
Id. at 140.
77
United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1888); see also Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561
U.S. 477, 539 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (summarizing the Supreme Court’s various definitions of
inferior officers listed here).
65
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and conclusive definition of inferior officer status.78 Instead, the Court conducts a
case-specific inquiry into the purported inferior officer. 79 Over the years, positions
including district court clerks,80 election monitors,81 federal marshals,82 military
judges,83 and judges in Article I courts have been declared inferior officers.84
Inferior officers are not the lowest class of civil servants within the Federal
Government—below them are employees. An employee is considered “subordinate
to officers of the United States,” as is an inferior officer. 85 For employees, the
Appointments Clause does not apply.86
While the distinction between inferior officers and employees has not been
widely litigated, the distinction is just as important as that between principal and
inferior officers. It dictates how a civil servant may be hired or fired, who they
answer to, and who stands accountable for their actions. When this difference is
applied to ALJs, questions of impartiality, accountability, and fairness in the
administrative system arise.
V. FREYTAG AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The question whether the SEC’s ALJs are inferior officers or employees was
first reached on the merits by a Circuit Court in August 2016, when the D.C. Circuit
held that the SEC’s ALJs were employees, not inferior officers.87 Four months later,
the merits were reached again when the Tenth Circuit held the opposite. 88 A 1991
Supreme Court case, Freytag v. Commissioner provided the precedent for each
circuit’s opinion.89
In Freytag, the Court confronted whether the Tax Court had the authority to
appoint Special Tax Judges (STJs), who could be assigned to hear four statutory
categories of cases.90 For the first three of those categories, the STJs were able to
hear, report, and decide the case on their own. 91 For the fourth category, the STJ
could hear the case and prepare proposed findings and opinions, but could not
actually decide the case.92 Instead, a regular Tax Court judge—appointed by the
President—needed to review the STJ’s proposed findings and opinion, and then
78
See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 539 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[E]fforts to define [inferior officer]
inevitably conclude that the term’s sweep is unusually broad.”).
79
See, e.g., id. at 539-40 (listing the various ways that the Supreme Court has defined “inferior
officer”).
80
In re Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 258 (1839).
81
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-99 (1879).
82
Id. at 397.
83
Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 170 (1994).
84
Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991); see also Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 540 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (listing those the Supreme Court has held to be inferior officers).
85
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976).
86
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (only requiring appointment for officers and inferior officers).
87
Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
88
Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1188 (10th Cir. 2016).
89
501 U.S. at 892. See Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1173-76; Lucia, 832 F.3d at 284-86 (discussing
Freytag, 501 U.S. 868).
90
Id. at 873. The authority to appoint STJ to the cases was conferred under the then-applicable 26
U.S.C. § 7443A(B). Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
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render a binding decision.93 Freytag’s controversy arose under that fourth
category.94
An STJ was assigned to the case, presided over the hearing, and issued a
proposed opinion finding liability. 95 That opinion was subsequently adopted by the
Tax Court.96 On appeal, Freytag argued that the STJ was actually an inferior officer
who had not been appointed in accordance with the requirements of the
Appointments Clause.97 Specifically, Freytag contended that the Chief Judge of the
Tax Court lacked the ability to appoint inferior officers, as the Chief Judge was
neither the President, a department head, nor a court of law. 98 The government
sought to rebut that argument by claiming that STJs assigned under the fourth
category of cases were not required to be appointed as they were employees of the
Tax Court, not inferior officers.99 In an odd attempt at supporting their argument,
the government conceded that STJs assigned to cases under the first three categories
were in fact inferior officers, but argued that STJs assigned to the fourth category of
cases could not be inferior officers because they lacked authority to issue final
decisions.100
Most of the Freytag decision was not spent on distinguishing between inferior
officers and employees, but rather focused on whether the Chief Judge had the
authority to appoint inferior officers. 101 Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded
that the Tax Court was in fact a court of law, and thus the Chief Judge wielded such
authority.102 However, in the Court’s brief discussion of the distinguishing
characteristics between employees and inferior officers, the Court set forth three
indicia of inferior officer status: (1) the position was established by law; (2) the
“duties, salary, and means of appointment for that [position were] specified by
statute”; and (3) the position performed “more than ministerial tasks” in an “exercise
[of] significant discretion.”103 Each of these indicia were answered in the affirmative
as to the STJ position, leading to a conclusion that STJs were inferior officers. 104
Moving on, the Court then stated that “[e]ven if the duties of [STJs] . . . were
not as significant as [the Court] found them to be, [their] conclusion would be
unchanged.”105 This contention seemed to be in response to the government’s
argument that Freytag had no standing to assert the duties of STJs assigned under the
first three categories.106 The Court dismissed this as “beside the point,” as STJs could
not be “inferior officers for purposes of some of their duties . . . but mere employees
93
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with respect to other responsibilities.”107 “The fact that an inferior officer on
occasion performs duties that may be performed by an employee . . . does not
transform his status under the Constitution.” 108 As result, the Court held that STJs
were inferior officers no matter what category of case was before them. 109
VI. THE D.C. CIRCUIT
The basic facts in the Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC are similar to those in
Bandimere. As in Bandimere, the SEC charged multiple investment companies with
misleading and deceptive advertising.110 The SEC instituted administrative actions,
and a hearing was held before an SEC ALJ.111 The ALJ found liability, and the
companies sought review by the SEC Commission who imposed the same
sanctions.112 The companies appealed to the D.C. Circuit, who agreed with the SEC
on the Appointments Clause challenge. 113
The D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Lucia can be traced back to its interpretation of
Freytag in an earlier case, Landry v. FDIC.114 There, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (“FDIC”) ALJs were not inferior officers
because they exercised no final decision-making authority.115 There, the D.C. Circuit
ruled that the FDIC’s ALJs were not inferior officers because they exercised no final
decision-making authority.116 Instead, the ALJs made recommendations to the FDIC
Board of Directors, who could choose whether or not to accept the
recommendation.117 Here, the D.C. Circuit first stated it’s view that the STJs’
authority to issue final decisions, at least in some cases, “was critical to the
[Supreme] Court’s decision” in Freytag.118
In 2012, the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed this interpretation in Tucker v.
Commissioner.119 In Tucker, the D.C. Circuit was confronted with an Appointments
Clause challenge to certain employees within the Internal Revenue Service’s Office
of Appeals.120 Relying on Landry, the D.C Circuit stated that the “main criteria for
drawing the line between inferior [o]fficers and employees not covered by the clause
are (1) the significance of the matters resolved by the officials, (2) the discretion they
exercise in reaching their decisions, and (3) the finality of those decisions.” 121
Predictably, the D.C. Circuit continued to apply its interpretation of Freytag in
2016 when it decided Lucia. As in Landry, the D.C. Circuit again stated that:
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[I]t understood that it “was critical to the [Supreme] Court’s decision” in Freytag
that the [STJ] had authority to issue final decisions in at least some cases, because
it would have been “unnecessary” for the Court to consider whether the tax judges
had final decision-making power when the judge in Freytag’s case exercised no such
power.122

With a lack of final decision-making power, the ALJ could not “be said to have been
delegated sovereign authority or to have the power to bind third parties, or the
government itself.”123 Therefore, the exercise of final decision-making authority was
determined to be the deciding factor in determining officer status.
In June 2017, a petition for rehearing of Lucia en banc was denied by an “equally
divided” D.C. Circuit.124
VII. THE TENTH CIRCUIT
The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the D.C. Circuit’s application of Freytag, with
a concurring judge calling it a “truncated legal framework,”125 but a dissenting
opinion agreed with the D.C. Circuit’s approach. 126 The concurring judge
wholeheartedly agreed with the majority, but wrote separately to repudiate the
dissent’s arguments in greater detail.127 Ultimately, the existence of three different
opinions provide for a deep scrutiny of the Appointments Clause issue, as well as
clear statements of arguments both for and against classifying the SEC’s ALJs as
inferior officers.
In applying Freytag, the majority spent very little time, and the dissent and
concurrence spent none, responding to the application of the first two characteristics
of the Supreme Court’s inferior officer test. It was easily accepted that the SEC ALJ
position was established by law—specifically the Administrative Procedures Act—
and there was no argument that the duties, salary, and means of appointment were
also provided by the APA in conjunction with SEC rules. 128 The final
characteristic—the exercise of significant discretion—quickly became the
centerpiece of the Tenth Circuit’s internal disagreement, as well as the delineating
factor with the D.C. Circuit.129
A. Significant Discretion and Final Decision-Making Authority
For the majority, the functions and duties of the ALJs were so closely
“commensurate” with those of the STJs, that ALJs must be considered inferior
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officers in the same vein.130 Specifically, the majority pointed to the ALJs’
“authority to shape the administrative record by taking testimony, regulating
document production and depositions, ruling on the admissibility of evidence, ruling
on dispositive and procedural motions, issuing subpoenas, and presiding over triallike hearings” where credibility determinations were afforded “considerable weight”
during SEC review.131
The most significant factor came in the form of the ALJs’ ability to issue initial
decisions that declare liability and impose sanctions. 132 If a party does not seek
timely review by the SEC, “the action of [the ALJ] shall, for all purposes, including
appeal or review thereof, be deemed the action of the Commission.”133 But even if
the party sought agency review, the SEC could decline the review in certain
categories of cases, effectively rendering the ALJ decision final. 134 Further, the ALJ
could enter default judgment against parties, hold and require attendance at
settlement conferences, and “set aside, make permanent, limit, or suspend temporary
sanctions that the SEC itself has imposed.”135 Each of these powers exemplify what
the majority viewed as significant authority and discretion.
In response, both the SEC and the dissent argued that the SEC’s ALJs could not
possibly be inferior officers as they do not exercise final decision-making power.136
The SEC and dissent supported this contention with the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in
Lucia, in particular that the Supreme Court “laid exceptional stress on the STJs’ final
decision-making power,” and with lack of such authority an ALJ could not be an
inferior officer.137 As the D.C. Circuit stated, the “analysis begins, and ends,
there.”138
The majority and concurrence disagreed with relying on the D.C. Circuit’s
precedent, believing it to be a “truncated framework” that “place[d] undue weight on
final decision-making authority.”139 On the contrary, the majority believed that
“properly read, Freytag did not place ‘exceptional stress’ on final decision-making
power,”140 as the STJs were classified as inferior officers based on the significance
of their duties and authority.141
The majority supported this view by reading Freytag’s “even if” argument as a
separate response to the standing challenge rather than “modify[ing] or supplant[ing]
[the court’s] holding that STJs were inferior officers based on the ‘significance of
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[their] duties and discretion.’”142 Thus, the majority viewed the Supreme Court as
stating that while the final decision-making authority in the first three categories was
enough to make the STJs inferior officers, final decision-making authority was not
relied upon for the fourth category. 143 Instead, the Supreme Court looked to the
extent of authority and discretion utilized by the STJ in the fourth category, resting
its decision on that determination prior to responding to the government’s standing
challenge.144 This interpretation is aptly summed up by the concurrence’s statement
that “final decision-making authority might be sufficient to make an employee an
[o]fficer, [but] that does not mean such authority is necessary for an employee to be
an [o]fficer.”145
The dissent, unpersuaded, continued to focus on the STJs’ “sovereign power to
bind the Government and the third parties,” combined with a high level of deference
afforded to the STJs as the distinguishing factor between Freytag and the present
case.146 This deference was exemplified by the Tax Court being “required to
presume correct the [STJ’s] factual findings . . . and to defer to the [STJ’s]
determinations of credibility.”147 The dissent saw this as “the difference between
chiseling in stone and drafting in pencil.”148 In support, the dissent noted that the
factual findings and legal opinions rendered by the STJs were “routinely adopted
verbatim by the regular Tax Court judges to whom they [were] assigned.” 149 In fact,
of 880 cases assigned to STJs between 1983 and 2015, the Tax Court had purported
to adopt all 880 of those cases verbatim. 150
This was distinguished from the SEC’s ALJs, where the SEC Commission had
only followed the recommendation of the ALJs in three out of thirteen appeals in
2016.151 Thus, the dissent viewed “the Commission [as] ‘ultimately control[ling] the
record for review[ing] and decid[ing] what is on the record,’” because it is the
Commission that “enters the final order—in all cases—and it is the commissioners
who shoulder the blame.”152 But the majority found it important that while the SEC
may have only followed the recommendation of ALJs in three out of thirteen appeals,
about ninety percent of all ALJ decisions “become final without any review or
revision from an SEC Commissioner.”153 Indeed, the SEC itself admitted that it
affords ALJs deference, especially in credibility determinations, and as a result
engages in “deferential, not de novo review of key aspects of its ALJs’ decisions.”154
The SEC attempted to add a caveat by stating that “[they] do not view the fact
that we accord Commission ALJs deference in the context of demeanor-based
credibility determinations to afford our ALJs with the type of authority that would
142
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qualify them as inferior officers.”155 But, per the concurrence, Bandimere was found
liable in “no small part on the United States’s assessment of his credibility during
live testimony, credibility determined by the only government employee designated
to preside over that testimony—an ALJ.”156 And while the SEC may sometimes
disagree with credibility determinations, the SEC’s own rules still entitled the “ALJ’s
evaluation of a witness’s live testimony . . . to ‘considerable weight.’” 157
As a final note, the majority concluded with a pointed remark towards a large
portion of the dissent’s argument: “[E]ven if the STJs exercise more authority than
the SEC ALJs, it does not follow that the former are inferior officers and the latter
are employees or that the latter do not exercise significant authority. . . . SEC ALJs
can still be inferior officers without possessing identical powers as STJs.” 158 With
this, the death knell was rung for the SEC’s ALJs; the majority quickly dispatched
of the SEC’s other arguments.
B. Deference to Congress
An additional argument put forth by the SEC urged the Tenth Circuit to
“‘accor[d] significant weight’ to [c]ongressional intent in determining whether the
ALJs [were] inferior officers.”159 In support, the SEC stressed that “Congress was
‘deliberate’ in constructing the statutory framework” supporting ALJs, their hiring
process, and their powers.160 The SEC contended that this suggests the congressional
intent was for ALJs to be employees.161 The majority quickly dismissed this, stating
that regardless of how careful Congress may have been in devising its statutory
scheme, or how effective it may be, it was the court’s place to strike it down if it was
unconstitutional.162 Regardless, the whole argument was beside the point because as
a circuit court, the Tenth Circuit was bound to follow Supreme Court precedent, and
the majority believed such precedent—Freytag—necessitated a result that the SEC’s
ALJs were inferior officers. 163
Further, deference to the workings of the political branches was raised by the
government in Freytag itself in an attempt at constitutional avoidance, but was
rejected by the Supreme Court.164 There, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had
requested that the Supreme Court defer to the Executive Branch’s own view that the
structural interests at issue were solely those of the Executive Branch, and argued
that the Supreme Court need not concern itself with the separation of power concerns
implicated.165 In a stern rebuke, the Supreme Court responded that “the Clause
forbids Congress to grant the appointment power to inappropriate members of the
Executive Branch. Neither Congress nor the Executive can agree to waive this
155
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structural protection. . . . The structural interests protected by the Appointments
Clause are not those of any one branch of Government but of the entire Republic.” 166
The Supreme Court then quickly moved on to the application of the Appointments
Clause, having easily dispensed with the government’s weak assertion. The majority
in Bandimere took a similar approach, summarily rejecting the SEC’s deference to
Congress argument in favor of honoring Supreme Court precedent.167
The dissent briefly acknowledged this argument by quoting the Supreme Court’s
statement that “‘we must hesitate to upset the compromises and working
arrangements that the elected branches of Government themselves have reached,’” 168
and then espousing the idea that “[i]n a close case regarding the application of a
constitutional rule in a discrete factual setting, and without much precedent to guide
us, deference to Congress seems particularly relevant.” 169 But the dissent offered no
further illumination on its viewpoint, likely due to the weakness of such a position.
C. “The Probable Consequences of Today’s Decision”
The dissent started its opinion with a dire warning, that this “opinion carries
repercussions that will throw out of balance the teeter-totter approach to determining
which of all the federal officials are subject to the Appointments Clause.” 170 While
the dissent did not believe that Freytag “mandate[d] the result . . . here,” it also
argued that the result reached by the majority was “too troublesome to risk without
a clear mandate from the Supreme Court.” 171 This was based on a fear that every
federal ALJ could not be declared an inferior officer, which would “effectively
render[] invalid thousands of administrative actions.”172
The main crux of the dissent’s argument was its view of a lack of explanation
by the majority on what specific duties were important to the declaration that the
ALJs exercised enough authority, or how much authority is too much. 173 In the end,
the dissent believed that the majority opinion “left . . . more questions than it
answer[ed].”174 The dissent exemplified such concerns by comparing the SEC’s
ALJs with those of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), finding no
meaningful differences.175 With no such meaningful differences, the dissent worried
that the SSA would grind to a halt should its ALJs be declared inferior officers in the
same vein as the SEC’s ALJs.176 In fact, the dissent pointed to an Appointment’s
Clause challenge to SSA ALJs having already been brought before a court.177
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The majority quickly swept this issue under the rug, acknowledging that its
decision “potentially implicate[d] other questions,” but cautioning that nothing
should be “read to answer any but the precise answer before this court: whether SEC
ALJs are employees or inferior officers.” 178 Essentially, the majority believed the
consequences of the case before them were best left for the future. 179
The concurrence attempted to add some clarity, calling the dissent’s predictions
“exaggerated,”180 as both Freytag and the majority call for a case-by-case
determination of officer status, and seek to avoid “sweeping pronouncements” as to
the constitutional status of officers and employees.181 Next, the concurrence rejected
the dissent’s suggestion that this opinion would lead to the “implosion of the federal
civil service, at least as to all federal ALJs,” and stated that the dissent “unnecessarily
sound[ed] the alarm.”182 Specifically, this focused on the argument that without
being considered employees, ALJs would lose their civil service protection of
removal for good-cause only.
This concern stems from Supreme Court precedent that some inferior officers
are removable only for good-cause, and that double-for-good-cause-removal
protection is constitutionally forbidden.183
Double-for-good-cause-removal
protection is created when inferior officer status is layered atop some other goodcause removal procedures. Here, the first layer of for-cause protection would be
created by the ALJ’s current removal procedures—by the Merit Systems Protection
Board (“MSPB”) for-cause only.184 The dissent believed the second layer would be
created by the removal procedure of the members of the MSPB—also for-cause
only.185 The combined layers of protection would insulate ALJs from both direct
removals by a superior officer or the President, as well as removal by manipulation
of the MSPB. The dissent feared that as a result of the majority’s holding, either
ALJs or the MSPB members would lose their for-cause protection.186
This fear was based on Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, a Supreme Court case in which dual-for-cause removal protection
for members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”)
violated the Constitution.187 The Supreme Court found that good-cause protection
was allowable, but no more than one level of protection can “separate[] the President
from an officer exercising executive authority.” 188 Thus, the congressional act that
authorized the PCAOB violated the Constitution when it both protected members of
the PCAOB from removal without good cause, and vested the ability to determine
*1. Further, it is doubtful the issue would have even been discussed in Manbeck, as the Court made it
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good-cause in the SEC’s Commissioners, who may also only be removed for goodcause.189
The concurrence viewed this as a simple fix, for “[a] court faced with such a
challenge would be empowered only to order the minimal remedy effective to cure
the Article II error, rendering the MSPB’s three members removable by the President
at will.”190 Accordingly, such a result would fix this hypothetical issue without
changing the protections the ALJ position currently enjoys. 191 This is similar to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Free Enterprise Fund. There, the Court rendered the
good-cause protection of the PCAOB members invalid, instead allowing them to be
removed by the SEC Commission at-will.192 As a result, the Board members were
only separated from the will of the President by one layer of good-cause protection—
that of the SEC Commissioners.193 The concurrence believed a similar result could
be reached regarding ALJs, should such a challenge be before the court. 194
Thus, despite adamant protest from both the SEC and Judge McKay in his
dissenting opinion, the Tenth Circuit determined that the SEC ALJ who presided
over the administrative hearing in Bandimere was an inferior officer of the United
States.195 As a result of this status, the ALJ held his position unconstitutionally, and
the SEC’s opinion was vacated.196
VIII. ANALYSIS
After the result of Bandimere, a circuit split has been created with regard to the
proper interpretation of Freytag. This may seem like an easily fixed issue, but the
split has potentially huge ramifications. Should the SEC’s ALJs be definitively
classified as inferior officers, others who received detrimental rulings by the SEC
will be provided with a roadmap for challenging those decisions. With this same
challenge popping up across the country, it is quite likely that Freytag will continue
to be scrutinized by the circuits.197
This Note focuses on the narrow issue of the proper interpretation and
application of Freytag. In the event that this issue is taken up by the Supreme Court,
it is likely that Freytag will become the centerpiece of this controversy, and will
provide a roadmap for other litigants seeking to challenge proceedings before ALJs.
Thus, this Note provides an analysis of the result compelled by a proper reading of
Freytag. Finally, there is a short discussion regarding deference to Congress on this
189
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issue, and a short note on the importance of circuit splits in gaining the attention of
the Supreme Court.
A. Interpreting Freytag
In Freytag, the Supreme Court identified three indicia of an inferior officer: (1)
that the position was established by law; (2) that the “duties, salary, and means of
appointment for that office [were] specified by statute”; and (3) that the purported
officer performs “more than ministerial tasks” in an “exercise [of] significant
discretion.”198 When applying this test, the D.C. Circuit and the Tenth Circuit have
reached completely opposite results. For the D.C. Circuit, final-decision making
power is the level of authority required to be an inferior officer rather than a mere
employee.199 Anything less results in employee status. By contrast, the Tenth Circuit
believes that while final decision-making power is sufficient, it is not necessary to
be considered an inferior officer.200 Instead, the level of discretion and the
significance of the potential officer’s duties must be adequately weighed.201
Of these two possible readings, the Tenth Circuit’s is superior. The D.C.
Circuit’s reading is in fact a “truncated framework” that improperly reads the “even
if” standing argument as an addition to the primary holding rather than an alternative
holding. This reading ignores the clear language of the Supreme Court’s test, and is
not consistent with the Supreme Court’s actual application of the test in Freytag.
While it is true that the D.C. Circuit has a much larger body of case law
distinguishing between inferior officers and employees than the Tenth Circuit does,
that precedent is based on a misapplication of the Freytag test in each successive
opinion, reading in final decision-making authority as an additional criterion not
present in Freytag.
In each of its decisions leading up to Lucia in 2016, the D.C. Circuit read the
“even if” argument in Freytag to be critical to the Supreme Court’s decision. Such
a reading ignores the structure of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Freytag. As put
forth by the Tenth Circuit in Bandimere, the “even if” argument was not a wholly
separate holding or an additional criterion. 202 Instead, it was a discrete and separate
response to the government’s argument that the petitioner in Freytag had no standing
to invoke the inferior officer status of the STJs in the first three categories. 203
Had the “even if” argument been a portion of the Supreme Court’s reasoning as
to the inferior officer status, there would have been no reason for severing it from
the preceding discussion. In fact, the Supreme Court had declared that the STJs were
inferior officers prior to even reaching this discussion.204 The pertinent portion of
Freytag can be read as two alternative ways to reach the same result. First, there are
the three indicia of inferior officer status that the majority used to arrive at its result
in Bandimere, and second, there is the “even if” argument that can be properly
delineated by the structure of the Supreme Court’s reasoning.
198
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In its discussion, the Supreme Court stated that the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue “reason[ed] that special trial judges may be deemed employees in [the
fourth category of] cases because they lack authority to enter a final decision.” 205 In
response, the Court stated that “this argument ignores the significance of the duties
and discretion that special trial judges possess.”206 The Court then went on to apply
what the Tenth Circuit read as the three indicia of inferior officer status.
In one portion of the Supreme Court’s reasoning, STJs are compared with
special masters, who are hired by Article III courts.207 The Court distinguished
between the two by applying the three indicia of officer status, and ended the
discussion by stating that “[i]n the course of carrying out . . . important functions,
the special trial judges exercise significant discretion.” 208 It is true that the Court
does not explicitly state that this line of reasoning led to the determination that STJs
are inferior officers. But this result is implicit in the reasoning; otherwise, the
Court’s comparison and all the preceding discussion would be moot.
After the Court compared the STJs with special masters, it stated that “[e]ven if
the duties of special trial judges under [the fourth category] were not as significant
as we and the two courts have found them to be, our conclusion would be
unchanged.”209 The final clause makes it clear that the Court had decided the STJs
were already inferior officers based on the significance of their duties and authority;
otherwise there would be no conclusion to change in the first place. This is likely
where the D.C. Circuit’s misinterpretation stems from.
At this point in the Freytag opinion, the Supreme Court was addressing the
government’s argument that Freytag had no standing “to assert the rights of
taxpayers whose cases are assigned to special trial judges” under the first three
categories.210 The ability to assert the rights under the first three categories was
important, as the government had conceded that the STJs were inferior officers in
regards to those categories on the basis of final decision-making authority.211 The
Court dismissed this argument, as STJs “are not inferior officers for purposes of
some of their duties . . . but mere employees with respect to other responsibilities.”212
Thus, the standing argument was “beside the point,” for “if a special trial judge is an
inferior officer for purposes of [the first three categories], he is an inferior officer
within the meaning of the Appointments Clause and he must be properly
appointed.”213 Such an assertion, on its own, would lead to a completely reasonable
interpretation that final decision-making authority was what led the Court to declare
STJs inferior officers. But this statement cannot be read in a vacuum. When read in
conjunction with the entirety of the Court’s reasoning on officer status, it is clear that
this is somewhat of an alternative argument addressing the absurdities of the
government’s concession that the STJs are somehow both inferior officers and
205
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employees.
The Supreme Court rested its decision that the STJs were inferior officers on the
application of three indicia of officer status, which looked to the exercise of
significant discretion. Thus, as stated in Bandimere, final decision-making authority
may be sufficient to be considered an inferior officer, but that does not in any way
make it necessary.214
B. Deference to Congress
Admittedly, the ability to put forth competing readings helps support the
dissent’s argument, that the status quo should remain in the absence of a clearer
mandate from the Supreme Court. In fact, the dissent argues that deference to
Congress is necessary, because when “faced with such uncertainty, ‘[the Court] must
hesitate to upset the compromises and working arrangements that the elected
branches of Government themselves have reached.’” 215 But, as noted by Justice
Scalia in another case, “the political branches cannot by agreement alter the
constitutional structure.”216
The Supreme Court has consistently read the Appointments Clause not as a mere
instructive procedure on how to appoint officers, but as a significant safeguard to the
structure of the Republic.217 And “[n]either Congress nor the Executive can agree to
waive this structural protection.”218
The Appointments Clause limits the
dispensation of power by Congress, and limits those that may receive such power. 219
This may “not always serve the Executive’s interests,” but it does protect those of
the entire United States.220
An argument that the current ALJ structure is somehow a threat to the entirety
of the United States may seem a bit hypocritical, “sounding the alarm” in the exact
opposite direction from the dissent. But this argument is not put forth in an attempt
to claim that the entirety of the administrative law system is unconstitutional, or that
ALJ position is not extremely useful. In fact, it is offered for the exact opposite
reason. The ALJ position is an extraordinary creation, without which the legal
system would likely strain to the point of breaking. Despite this, “the fact that a
given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions
of the government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.
Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of a
democratic government.”221 The potential ease of fixes to the ALJ appointment
defect makes it all the more important that this issue be solved as quickly as possible
to maintain a level of confidence and fairness in the administrative law system.
For example, the Appointments Clause clearly states that the power to appoint
inferior officers may be conferred to the head of an administrative agency. As the
SEC is an independent agency, the heads of the agency—the Commissioners—
214
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would be able to constitutionally appoint ALJs. Despite this seemingly simple fix,
commentators have noted that such actions would be seen as an admission by the
SEC that the current ALJ appointments process is unconstitutional, and potentially
subject pending and existing SEC orders to new challenges. 222 Despite these
challenges, with the ruling in Bandimere, and the upcoming en banc rehearing in
Lucia, the SEC will likely be forced to remedy the situation in some manner.
C. Competing Understandings and the Least Mischief
The Bandimere dissent began by stating, in the absence of a clear mandate from
the Supreme Court, that it “would prefer the outcome that does the least mischief.” 223
In effect, this would avoid the creation of a circuit split on this important issue. But
the presence of a circuit split is one of the most, if not the most, important factors
that the Supreme Court considers when deciding whether or not to grant certiorari. 224
In fact, a study of certiorari petitions from 2003 to 2005 showed that of those granted
by the Supreme Court, cases involving a conflict of opinion in lower courts ranged
from 58.4 percent to 78.9 percent of those in which certiorari was granted. 225 Thus,
avoiding “mischief” would seem to be a poor judicial philosophy when a particularly
important issue is at hand. This is especially true when the most applicable Supreme
Court precedent can arguably be read in two separate manners, even if one reading
is clearly more faithful to the actual text of the opinion.
Had Judge McKay’s dissenting preference prevailed, an intra-circuit split would
have been created rather than an inter-circuit split. But intra-circuit splits do not
create the same probability of certiorari being granted. Instead, the Supreme Court
prefers to leave intra-circuit disputes to be resolved from within, as “[i]t is primarily
the task of a Court of Appeals to reconcile its internal difficulties.” 226
While it is true that the existence of a circuit split might be the most important
factor in determining whether certiorari may be granted, it is far from the only factor.
The Supreme Court also considers cases where lower courts have “decided an
important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by [the
Supreme Court], or has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts
with relevant decisions of [the Supreme Court].”227 It is hard to imagine that a
decision declaring that administrative law judges require constitutional appointment
would not be such an important federal question. Thus, while the existence of a
circuit split may be sufficient to catch the attention of the Supreme Court, it is far
from necessary. Regardless, higher odds of review are never a poor idea.
In an ideal future, the Supreme Court will take up this issue, and provide a clear
222
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mandate that allows agencies to determine whether the agencies’ ALJs are exercising
too much power, and if so, to appoint them in a manner that comports with the
Constitution.228 Even if the impending rehearing by the D.C. Circuit, and possible
review by the Tenth Circuit, results in the circuit split dissolving, the question of the
constitutionality of ALJs in other agencies will not simply vanish. The SEC may
remedy the manner in which it appoints ALJs, but as pointed out by the dissent in
Bandimere, other agencies use ALJs in a significantly similar manner.229 But at least
for the case at hand, the Tenth Circuit has taken the correct first step by putting the
SEC on notice that it is using its ALJs in a manner that does not comport with the
requirements of the Constitution.
IX. CONCLUSION
Hopefully, the result in Bandimere will begin forcing the SEC to reconsider the
constitutionality of its ALJ appointment process. The administrative law system is
expansive, and in effect, encompasses the powers of all three branches of
government.230 While the ALJ position may be an amazing creation of American
law that allows the United States to function smoothly in an age of constant litigation,
the ALJs are not immune from the checks and balances embedded in the
Constitution.
Ultimately, a fix is unlikely to significantly alter the functioning of the
administrative law system, as demonstrated by the SEC Commissioners simply
appointing their own ALJs. While that fix may potentially implicate many other
SEC decisions and orders, and is the type of mischief the dissent in Bandimere
advocated against, the status quo cannot be maintained if it is unconstitutional. It
has been noted by another commentator that this argument values form over function,
but “[d]istrupting a system that is largely working should factor into the solution,”
not determine the constitutionality of that system. 231
It is true that whatever the solution, many SEC decisions will likely be called
into question. Perhaps the SEC should have begun to consider such a possibility
when the constitutionality of its ALJs was first called into question in 2015. 232
Instead, the SEC chose to ignore the warning signs, likely bolstered by the friendly
result in Lucia. But the SEC cannot continue to ignore this issue or kick the can
down the road. The SEC, and any other agencies utilizing a similar approach to
appointing ALJs, must accept the repercussions of its actions and attempt to move
forward. While other approaches to fixing the unconstitutionality of the current ALJ
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appointments process have been put forth, 233 the simplicity of having the agency
head appoint the agency’s own inferior officers makes the most sense, and would be
the easiest to put into practice. But, regardless of the approach taken to remedy this
situation, the Tenth Circuit was correct in Bandimere to uphold the structure the
Constitution put in place.
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See Kent H. Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandry, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 802 (2013) (calling for
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